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Implementation is represented in the capital budgeting process as a solitary stage 
that begins after the decision to adopt and ends with the post-audit.  For 
investments in advanced manufacturing technology, this belies the complexity of 
implementation and the financial risk.  Many unexpected problems arise.  The 
alternative solutions, with their costs and benefits, warrant rational evaluation.  
This study explores the process of implementation to identify what cost-benefit 




Investment in advanced manufacturing technology (AMT)1 can be a difficult and risky venture 
for companies.  Much of this risk manifests itself during the implementation phase of the 
investment when problems arise that demand resolution.  Even when planning has been 
thoughtful and extensive, in this stage, things go wrong.   Unplanned and often considerable 
expenditures are needed to get the investment back on course.  In the end, the financial 
performance of the new technology can be quite different from that planned. 
 
Much research has been done on pre-adoption stages of capital budgeting and the post-audit.  
However, little has been written in the capital budgeting literature on the very critical process of 
implementation.  The research described in this paper deals with the implementation of advanced 
manufacturing technology, financial decision-making in this stage and the measurement of 
project success.   
 
Capital Budgeting Evaluation of AMT 
 
Empirical studies, such as Pike (1996), have identified the techniques used to evaluate the risk and 
net benefits of capital investments.  ‘Sophisticated’ techniques for the latter have been identified as 
net present value and internal rate of return and the less sophisticated, although well represented, 
pay back period.  These are well entrenched in business practice. 
 
In the case of investments in AMT, however, various researchers have noted a departure from the 
traditional evaluation techniques.  In his case study of five American manufacturing companies, 
Dean (1987) found that while clearly acceptable projects were argued on the basis of the 
economics, marginal projects were “bolstered by a story about strategic and intangible benefits 
(p.132)”  Dean found the tendency to emphasize the strategic and intangible benefits increased as 
1 Most commonly, AMT is computer-controlled equipment used for such things as manufacturing, design, engineering, 
raw material and inventory handling and control and decision support.  AMT ranges from a solitary stage in the 
manufacturing process that is numerically controlled (NC) to computer integration of all stages of operations including 
cost accounting and purchasing. 
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the cost or risk of the project increased, as financial returns decreased or as the returns became 
harder to calculate.  Nixon and Lonie (1992) also noted a shifting emphasis on financial versus 
qualitative factors, which depended on the project's technological and commercial risk as well as its 
strategic significance. 
 
Carr, Tompkins and Bayliss (1995) studied strategic investment decisions (SIDs)2 in German and 
UK automotive companies to observe the use and influence of financial and strategic analytical 
techniques in the investment decision process.  Although they found many differences cross-
nationally, Carr et al (1995) found a good deal of commonality.  For example, they found 
accounting/finance, used mostly for “devil’s advocate” purposes, took place late in the decision 
process and had little influence in strategic investment decisions; contrary financial results would 
be overridden if there were compelling strategic reasons; pay back method predominated as an 
evaluation technique; and beyond crude sensitivity analysis, little risk analysis was employed. 
 
In contrast with the UK companies, many of the German companies studied were small to mid-
sized, privately held and in many cases, owner operated.  Carr et al found the German SID-making 
was less financially oriented, more informal, strategic and longer-term in perspective.  The German 
companies, in general, used longer pay back hurdles and these were less rigidly adhered to.  
Overall, Carr et al (1995) found SIDs were “ultimately determined more by strategic 
considerations emerging from informal decision-making processes, than by application of more 
formal capital budgeting techniques (p. xiii).” 
 
Similarly, Collier and Gregory (1995) noted companies with “dominant leadership exercised by 
one individual” used simpler, more informal appraisal methods (p. 52).  They also found the 
simpler, informal evaluation system tended to be used by companies that were concentrated in a 
single, well-defined industry (p. 52). 
 
In making these observations, Collier and Gregory (1995) and Carr et al (1995) recognized capital 
budgeting activities, although unconventional or less ‘sophisticated,’ were indeed taking place in 
the organizations studied.  Together with Dean (1987) and Nixon and Lonie (1992), these studies 
serve to expand the definition of capital budgeting evaluation of AMT, particularly in small, 
focused, owner-managed organizations.  
 
The studies described above deal with the phases of capital budgeting preceding and including 
the decision to adopt.   Like most other studies of capital budgeting, they disregard the 
significance of AMT implementation.  The following section, drawing from the innovation 
literature, describes more fully the process of implementation.   
 
The Process of Implementation 
 
Voss (1988) defines implementation as “the user process that leads to the successful adoption of 
an innovation of new technology.”3  He argues the success of an innovation in a user organization 
2 A major investment in AMT, made to replace conventional technology, typically qualifies as a SID. 
3 Voss (1988) describes implementation as beginning at the time of planning and design, arguing that many of the actions 
at this stage, such as strategic and technical planning and workforce participation are important determinants of 
implementation success (p. 59).  He describes the implementation process as consisting of at least three stages: pre-
installation, installation and commissioning, and post-commissioning (consolidation).  Pre-installation begins with 
planning and design and ends with the decision to invest.  Installation and commissioning begins once the decision to 
adopt is made and ends when the technology is operational and achieving target technical measures consistently.  Post-
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can depend greatly on implementation.   Marsh et al (1988 p.61) likewise stress its importance: 
“implementation is not the end of the process, but the key overall issue.” 
 
Studies of AMT implementation have revealed the process is fraught with setbacks, at times 
threatening the entire project.  Leonard-Barton (1988) terms these setbacks misalignments, which 
often result from mismatches between the technology and the user environment in terms of the 
project’s technical requirements, the system delivering the technology to users or user 
organization performance. 
 
Leonard-Barton studied the implementation of new process technologies and found misalignments 
between the technology and the user environment in her case studies.  She described the process 
undertaken by the organizations as cycles of adaptation: "the process of circling back to revisit a 
decision point - re-opening issues of technical design that the developers assumed were resolved, 
redesigning delivery systems in the user environment or 'unfreezing' organizational routine to re-
examine the goals implied by current performance criteria" (p. 260).  She found these cycles varied 
in magnitude depending on how fundamental the misalignment (p. 261) and they could be either 
beneficial or detrimental.   
 
The adaptation cycles observed by Leonard-Barton fell into two groups: a) technology adaptation 
and b) organizational adaptation. The former encompassed the resolution of technology 
misalignments and the latter dealt with organizational performance criteria and delivery system 
misalignments. 4  She also observed adaptation alternatives -- a given misalignment could often be 
resolved with either an organizational or technological adaptation or a combination of the two. This 
has particular relevance to the study of capital budgeting as each action would have its own benefits 
and costs. 
 
Measures of Project Success 
 
When evaluating implementation, it is important to consider project success and its measurement.  
Willcocks and Lester (1993) surveyed forty companies to determine what level of project 
evaluation was carried out at various stages of an investment in information technology.  Eighty 
percent of the companies evaluated the project in the post-commissioning stage, but many used 
additional criteria to those used in the feasibility stage.  Willcocks and Lester suggest the 
acceptance of a project using one set of criteria and measurement of its success using another 
may be problematic (p. 32).  They did not suggest what the problems might be, nor did they 
establish why such changes to success measures arise. 
 
In reviewing various studies, Voss (1985) found success of implementation measured in technical 
terms such as percent of up-time, use in actual production and whether the new technology had 
been in use for a full year (p. 58).  Often overlooked were expected benefits and the original 
objectives of the investment such as flexibility and improved quality.  "Full success," Voss argues, 
"can only be considered to have been realised if the benefits being looked for are realised, and 
ideally realised in the marketplace through increased competitiveness" (p. 58). 
 
Method 
commissioning activities include technical improvements and any changes (adaptations) necessary to achieve business 
success (p. 59). 
4 Lindberg (1992) added ‘strategic adaptation’ to this classification, which occurs when the goals of the implementation or 
the project’s “strategic tasks (p. 61)” are changed in response to performance misalignments. 
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The aim of this study was to explore what capital budgeting evaluation goes on in the post-
adoption stages of AMT investments and the implications.  Project success and its measures were 
also explored. 
 
Data was collected using the case study method as described by Yin (1989).  This qualitative, 
field-based technique is particularly well suited to the study of processes in general (Leonard-
Barton, 1992) and the field of capital budgeting in particular (Bower, 1970; Carr et al, 1991) 
because of its ability to observe subtleties and changes not collectable with survey instruments. 
 
The case study method requires in-depth data collection by interview, document review and/or 
participant observation following a pre-set protocol.  The sites are not randomly selected and are 
not expected to be representative of a greater population.  Rather, they are specifically selected on 
the basis of their similarity on various variables so other variables can be compared.  From the data, 
propositions are derived, ready for further study either with more cases or empirical methods.  This 
grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) is particularly appropriate for exploration of 
uncharted processes and concepts. 
 
Private and closely-held, preferably owner-managed companies were desired.  Of five companies 
studied, three had invested in AMT in the previous two years and were in post-adoption stages of 
implementation.5  To qualify as a case study site, companies had to have had at least one 
misalignment of sufficient magnitude to yield relevant data.   
 
Companies to which advanced technology was important for competitiveness were sought.  The 
companies selected were either serving small local markets or were disadvantaged by distance 
from large markets.  For the former, economies of scope and flexible technology were 
particularly important.  For the latter, economies of scale and low unit costs were important. 
 
The studies took place between March and December 1995.  The managers involved with the 
project were interviewed.  Included were those people integral to the adoption decision and those 
involved in the implementation.  Open-ended interviews guided respondents to discuss the 
project goals, misalignments, how these misalignments were resolved, analysis of adaptation 
alternatives and success as per project goals.  All companies described misalignments and 
adaptations in the implementation of their investment.  There were various degrees of success 
and satisfaction with the projects.  A summary of the cases is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
The procedure for data analysis was adapted from Carr, Tompkins and Bayliss (1995). Themes 
on which to compare and contrast the cases were selected.   These included owner background, 
profitability, market share, in-house expertise, newness of the technology to the company, 
customization, reason for the investment (economic, strategic), stage of implementation, 
misalignment attributes, how resolved, rationale, extent to which goals were met, 
necessity/urgency of technology’s operation and ad hoc adaptations.  Data were compared by 
theme, company, project and misalignment.  Companies were also grouped by their standing on 
various themes and compared with other themes.  For instance, companies making the investment 
for economic reasons were compared against those making a strategic investment.  As patterns 
emerged, propositions were developed, which form the basis for further research. 
 
5 The fourth company was implementing new product technology (rather than process) and the fifth company was still 
in the pre-adoption stage of the investment process. 
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Data and Analysis 
Case Descriptions 
 
CP, an owner-managed manufacturer of pre-cast concrete products, invested in a comprehensive 
batch plant with programmable logic control (plc) as part of a major strategic initiative.  To save 
money, the system was designed in-house by the resident engineer/plant manager.  This 
investment was a top-management initiative, which was long into the post-installation stage.  
Although operating, it was still not achieving business success.  The designing engineer left the 
company shortly after installation. 
 
CP experienced several significant misalignments, the essence of which was poor quality output 
necessitating regular manual override of the plc.  Continued operation of the batch plant was 
critical, as it had completely replaced the old mixer.  High raw material variances, particularly of 
stabilizing chemical additives, red-flagged the misalignments. 
 
FP, run by a general manager reporting directly to the two owners, manufactured fiberglass 
reinforced plastic pipe using conventional machinery almost entirely.  In order to increase output 
and meet a huge surge in demand, FP retrofitted a mechanical filament winder with computer 
control.  The change in capability of the winder was to be accompanied by a change in the 
manufacturing process to take advantage of winder’s new flexibility.  The investment was 
evaluated using payback period.  The benchmark used was 1.5 – 2 years, as this was the rate of 
payback on most FP’s investments in equipment.  The project was part of a larger investment, on 
which payback would be longer than usual.  To shorten the payback period, only one part of the 
project was initiated, with FP taking a wait-and-see attitude for later stages.   
 
After many technical glitches were resolved, the FP winder still performed erratically, even 
dangerously.  Operators noted its problems occurred on certain diameters of pipe and thus 
avoided its use on these diameters.  Ironically, these particular diameters were the ones 
specifically intended for the automated winder to maximize savings.  For two years, engineering 
and management were not aware of the operators’ adjustments to the process.  At the time of the 
study, the winder investment was in the consolidation stage and achieving most technical and 
some business measures. 
 
AP, an owner-managed manufacturer of aftermarket automobile parts, invested in CNC laser 
cutting technology to diversify its product line and markets.  Although somewhat familiar with 
advanced manufacturing technology, this was the first experience with a laser.  The owner and 
top managers initiated the investment.  The investment was evaluated using the ROI technique, 
but managers where emphatic in saying this had little influence on the decision.  The most 
conservative comments were those of the Vice President: Administration/Comptroller:  
 
We do (estimate) our rate of return, but we don't pay that much attention to it initially 
because [the new technology] is more of a developmental tool.  We are very fortunate, 
we're in a business where the margins on our core products are very nice.  We can afford 
to take risks sometimes, we can afford to do something on a whim, by the seat of our 
pants and we do that because the gentleman that owns the company somehow has a 
tremendous vision and he is very insightful into where our industry is going.  As with 
anybody, sometimes you are wrong but more than not, he gets into technology that is 
very helpful down the road, if not today.  We find a way to use it that will ultimately help 
our bottom line.  Maybe not this year, but eventually it will. 
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Due partly to lack of manufacturer support, the laser had a very long installation.  Once 
operational, AP discovered it could not cut plastic, latex and rubber, which was fifty percent of 
its intended application.  They quickly responded by acquiring a water-jet cutter to supplement 
the laser.  For other materials, the laser was achieving technical and some business measures at 




During the post-adoption stages of implementation, nine misalignments arose amongst the three 
companies.  They were a mix of technical, organizational and strategic misalignments.  
Adaptations ranged from recalibrating weigh scales to the $350,000 purchase of an alternative 
technology (water jet cutter). 
 
In the adoption stage of the investment the companies compared the incremental costs and 
benefits using accepted, although unsophisticated techniques.  However, as misalignments arose 
and were resolved, the companies did very little traditional analysis of the economic costs and 
benefits.  Their focus was very much on getting the equipment to work as best they could, in the 
most expedient manner.  This is not to imply costs and benefits were ignored, however.  Informal 
cost-benefit evaluations using atypical measures were described by respondents.   The forecast 
costs of adaptation were compared against either:  
  
I. the cost to date of the total investment,  
II. original benefits of the project yet to be realized,  
III. adaptation costs compared to ongoing misalignment costs to be saved, or  
IV. the total investment cost of the alternative technologies (in addition to the initial 
capital outlay). 
 
In the cost to date evaluation, the managers used the justification that the value of the overall 
investment could be recovered with the expenditure under consideration.  The relative size of the 
adaptation expenditure, as compared to these other costs, guided the decision.  This was evident 
at CP and FP. 
 
Using an original benefits evaluation, decision-makers compared the adaptation cost to the 
original benefits to be recovered from fixing the technology.  The benefit to be gained may have 
been part or all of the original benefits depending on the extent of the misalignment and how 
much of the misalignment the particular adaptation was expected resolve.  For instance, at AP, 
the adaptation cost of a new water jet cutter was compared to the rubber cutting cash flows the 
original cutting technology had been expected to generate. 
 
Adaptation cost evaluation was evident, such as at CP, where the cost of the adaptation was 
weighed against the savings of extra chemicals otherwise needed to compensate for the 
performance problems of the equipment.  CP’s general manager/controller described the 
evaluation as follows:  
 
The raw-material variances were $30,000.  That’s about what we will pay the electrician/ 
automation specialist to work on it for a year.  It was a tradeoff.  Any other benefits are 
gravy.  It was a no-brainer. 
 
This evaluation involved a sunk cost rationale; however, net economic benefit of the original 
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project was compromised. 
 
The final evaluation type, alternative technology investment cost involved comparing the total 
cost, including quantifiable adaptation costs, with the projected costs of the original project 
alternatives.  After explaining that the investment cost was nearly triple the forecast amount of 
$55,000, one manager justified the added investment as follows:  “I offset that amount with the 
fact that the $150,000 actual investment is still inexpensive compared to [the commercially 
available technology], even $400,000.” 
 
These four types of evaluation were used almost unconsciously for relatively minor expenditures 
and more deliberately for larger adaptation expenditures.  While some may have been sunk cost 
rationale in action, some were simply an act of desperation with little regard for overall project 
feasibility. 
 
Of the companies studied, only AP used a traditional capital budgeting evaluation of its 
adaptation.  When the installation and operation of the new technology was fraught with 
problems and delays, a second technology was purchased.  This major adaptation had its own 
ROI calculation, done as a matter of procedure.  Far more influential, however, was its 
operational and strategic relationship to the original investment.  The second investment, made to 
replace the first acquisition until it was working, was also expected to help recover the strategic 
benefit lost to its unanticipated, permanent limitations.  Such attendance to the project’s non-
financial goals was a common element in adaptation evaluation among the companies that had 
made the investment for strategic reasons.  Similar to the observations made by Carr et al (1995) 
that economic analysis was overridden by strategic considerations, the goals of the AMT project 
often overrode the economics of adaptation selection.   
 
The economic techniques observed for evaluating adaptation expenditures can allow an 
investment to become infeasible.  While the comparison of the adaptation expenditure with the 
project benefits to be recouped or with ongoing misalignment costs to be saved is consistent with 
sunk cost rationale, the comparisons did not include the value of abandonment.  The net benefit 
of the adaptation should not be less than the value of abandonment. 
 
The two other justifications of adaptation expenditure observed, the comparison of the adaptation 
expenditure with the to-date capital investment and the comparison of the adaptation expenditure 
plus the initial capital outlay with the total investment cost of the alternative technologies, are in 
violation of sunk cost principles.  In these cases, some of the behavioral finance phenomena 
described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Statman and Caldwell (1987) may have been at 
play.  These behavioral influences may help explain the decision-making observed.  Certainly, 
the investments described in the case studies were major investments for the companies.  The 
owner/managers were, understandably, very emotionally committed to the investment.  In the 
words of one owner/manager, “this investment cost too much, I’m going to get it to work or die 
trying.” 
 
The use of a TINA (There Is No Alternative, Carr et al 1995) rationale was also observed.  It 
occurred only with economic investments, for technical misalignments and when there was a 
sense of urgency or production was highly dependent on the new equipment.  TINA was also 
prevalent among adaptation decisions made by equipment operators who were unfamiliar with 
the greater purpose and goals of the investment.  Naturally, the occurrence of TINA is 
problematic since limiting alternatives bounds rational decision-making and can result in inferior 
project performance. 
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Project Success Measures 
Implied in every discretionary investment is the goal of economic feasibility: the project should 
yield a net economic benefit.  This seemed to be the goal that suffered the most.  Often 
companies did not really have a grasp of whether the project was still a net benefit or not.  In AP, 
feasibility became increasingly dependent on the project’s real options.   
 
Generally, managers made compromises throughout the process of implementation.  
Occasionally, some measures of success increased, however, expectations were mostly lowered 
as described by the comptroller of AP: “The laser is now working.  It is doing everything we 
wanted it to do … now that we have accepted that it can’t cut certain materials.” At CP and FP, 
managers simply felt relieved the technology was functioning, if only minimally.   
 
As a result of learning and compromises made, companies adopted a longer view of project 
success -- they accepted that success would be realized much later than originally anticipated.  
This was articulated by CP’s President:  “This investment is reasonably successful.  It will be 
very successful.  It could have been successful sooner.”  In some cases, this acceptance was 
difficult since delay was expensive. 
 
These results shed some light on Willcocks and Lester’s (1993) survey results that criteria for 
post-completion evaluation were different from those of the design and feasibility phase.  The 
current study revealed an evolution of goals and measures of success as misalignments and 
adaptations occurred, as compromises were necessitated and as learning was gained. 6 Indeed, 
Butler et al (1993) consider the learning gained as part of a project’s success. 
Conclusions 
Observations of three companies in the post-adoption stage of capital budgeting revealed activities 
similar to those described in the case studies of capital budgeting and SID-making for AMT by 
Bower (1970), Butler et al (1993), Carr et al (1995), Collier and Gregory (1995), Dean (1987), 
Lumijarvi (1991) and  Nixon and Lonie (1992).  These activities included cost-benefit and strategic 
analysis and the unfolding of measures of success. 
 
This suggests the presence of capital budgeting decision-making throughout implementation.7  
Indeed, the complexity and financial impact of some of the misalignments observed suggest 
rational evaluation of adaptation alternatives throughout implementation is needed to help achieve 
project and corporate objectives.8 
 
This study, however, noted economic evaluation of adaptations significantly different from the 
pre-purchase capital budgeting techniques considered customary.  This suggests we question the 
rationality of these adaptation expenditure evaluations as well as consider the applicability of 
pre-purchase techniques to post-purchase decisions. 
 
In no case did the companies appear to revisit the overall project evaluation to question whether 
6 In fact, the changed criteria are likely more realistic than the originals, which would be an improvement. 
7 Since multiple misalignments can occur, organizations may engage in iterative capital budgeting evaluations. 
8 It may also improve decision efficiency if, as suggested by Bowler, Primrose and Leonard (1995), “varying opinions 
on the relative merits of particular implementation techniques are able to be resolved as the enforced discipline of 
estimating costs and quantifying benefits helps clarify implementation decisions”(p. 10). 
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the project was still feasible with the added costs of adaptations and foregone benefits.  Given 
the observed absence of post-audit activities, economic feasibility may never be known. 
 
The cases bring to light the importance of “feasibility checks” of the overall project.  It is 
important to be diligent in reviewing the investment periodically as it progresses through the 
stages of implementation.  The review should be comprehensive and objective.  The exercise 
alone can bring to light areas where things have gone wrong.  Unlike the typical post-audit, 
however, the performance of the investment has to be measured against its goals, technical 
measures of success and impact in the marketplace (business success).  Its use on the plant floor 
needs to be studied and the insights of all involved in the implementation should be gathered. 
 
Implementation misalignments pose a threat to project feasibility and uneconomic adaptations 
exacerbate this.  Rather than leaving post-purchase activities to the discretion of engineers, 
technicians and operators, those concerned with the project’s overall economic value should remain 
involved throughout post-purchase stages as misalignments threaten the value of the project and 
further choices need to be made that impinge on the net benefit of the investment.
 
28th Annual Atlantic Schools of Business Conference 10 
Appendix 1: Case Data 
 
 CP Company  FP Company   
Private, locally owned * *  
Owner operated *   
Primarily custom 
manuf. 
 *(70%)  
Local vs. Export 
market 
local majority local  
Employees 27 280  
Annual Sales $2,600,000 22,000,000  
Profit Margin 5% n/a       
Total Assets (TA) $2,400,000 8,000,000  
Ann. Capital Budget $225,000 2,700,000 
(normally $500,000) 
 
Usual proportion of 
capital budget for 
advanced technology 
irregular, automation necessary but not 
prevalent 
very little new technology  
Projected invest (PI) $150,000 $65,000  
PI/TA 6.25% 13% (2.4%)  
Technology Automated batch plant Automate filament winder    
Investment made from 
strength/ weakness 
from weakness economically, 
reactive; modest strength strategically 
from weakness/ reactive    
Reason economic, to support strategic investment economic  
Use of TINA yes yes  
Accountant and 
training 
one, MBA degree yes, Chartered Accountant      
Necessity/ urgency critical necessary      
No. of Misalignments 5 2  
Essence of 
misalingments 
poor quality output required regular 
manual override 
winder erratic, ruined product and was 
potentially dangerous 
         
  
Predominant rationale TINA, some economic and non-economic 
on long- term solution 
TINA   
  
Financial consideration short-term - disregard costs to maintain 
production; long-term  - research and 
spend as needed to make it work.  Costs 
compared to overall cost of project and 
size of losses 
not concerned with optimal use, for 
modest expenditures, spend as needed.  
Major expenditures not encountered, but 
delay incurred high opportunity cost. 
     
       
     
Success/ goal 
achievement 
not achieving technical measures achieving technical and some business 
measures 
     
    
Stage Installation and commissioning consolidation  
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